firms (those without analyst coverage within 5 years of their issuance) and non-orphan IPO firms (those with analyst coverage within 5 years of their issuance). This paper addresses the question of the importance of analyst coverage for the long-run returns of IPO firms over the period from 1991 to 2010.
Over the years, academic research has noted the importance of analyst coverage. Krigman et al. (2001) suggested that the most important motivation for firms to switch underwriters between their IPO and a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) is to obtain additional and influential analyst coverage. Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004) argued that the underpricing of newly public firms is positively related to analyst coverage. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004) , the average underpricing of IPOs was 7 per cent in the 1980s, which doubled to 15 per cent from 1990 to 1998, before jumping to 65 per cent during the internet bubble. Part of this increase can be attributed to analyst coverage, which has grown more important over the years. Bradley et al. (2003) showed that the number of managing underwriters in a syndicate is a good indicator of the coverage enjoyed by newly listed firms at the time of their IPOs. Corwin and Schultz (2005) examined the syndicates of 1638 IPOs and found evidence that each additional co-manager results in 0.8 additional analyst recommendations within 3 months of the IPO. Bradley et al. (2008b) , however, did not find incremental coverage to be related to improved long-run performance. Bradley et al. (2004) focused on the 2-year post-issue performance (at the end of the IPO's quiet period) of IPOs that receive analyst coverage compared to those that do not. The authors found that orphans significantly underperformed compared to non-orphans during the period from 1996 to 1998.
Unlike Bradley et al. (2004) , we analyse long-run performance from one to five years after the IPO. We measure the influence of analyst coverage on the long-run performance of IPO firms over a five-year horizon. We are then able to observe how long-run performance adjusts to analyst coverage. Our observation period is large and encompasses the period from 1991 to 2010. Our definition of an orphan IPO firm differs from that of Bradley et al. (2004) because the authors consider an IPO firm to be an orphan if "there is an absence of a research report/analyst recommendation at the end of the quiet period by at least one underwriter in the managing syndicate".
In US IPOs, during the one-to five-year horizon, we find a significant long-run abnormal performance by orphans (IPOs without analyst coverage) compared to nonorphans (IPOs with analyst coverage). For instance, by the fifth year after the IPO, buyand-hold abnormal returns for orphans were a significant -52.95 per cent compared to -8.07 per cent for non-orphans, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Further analysis reveals that this outperformance by non-orphans stems from high analyst coverage. Our results are robust after accounting for venture capital backing, underwriting syndicates, underpricing, institutional investor ownership, or operating performance variables.
The paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the existing literature. In the second section, we describe the methodology, data and sample statistics. The third section presents the findings, and the last section concludes the paper. Khorana et al. (2009) examine the consequences of the loss of coverage for a firm over the period from 1983 to 2004. They find that firms that lose all analyst coverage are significantly more likely to get delisted. This study sheds light on the importance of analyst coverage for firms. To avoid such a situation, the firm may acquire the means to attract financial analysts during its IPO process. Previous studies have found that the underwriting syndicate and the presence of venture capitalists or institutional investors in the IPO, as well as underpricing, allow the firm to increase its probability of analyst coverage. Krigman et al. (2001) reveal that changes in underwriters (between an IPO and an SEO) are made because the firm wants more reputable underwriters that will provide more coverage. The authors find that firms are more likely to make changes when analyst coverage is not to their liking. In addition, firms do not hesitate to allocate resources to improving their coverage. According to Ellis et al. (2005) , almost 50 per cent of firms making an SEO change their lead underwriters. This change takes place not because of the reputation of the underwriter but for the coverage of analysts whose buy recommendation are often more favourable than those of their predecessors. Corwin and Schultz (2005) examine the underwriting syndicates of 1638 IPOs between 1997 and 2002 in the United States. They emphasise the importance of co-managers, stating that the addition of a co-manager to the syndicate increases analyst coverage within the 3 months after the IPO. Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that co-managers are included in syndicates exclusively to provide additional coverage.
Literature review
The presence of venture capitalists in the IPO may encourage analysts to follow the firm. Several studies note a positive relationship between the presence of venture capitalists in the IPO and analyst coverage. Jain and Kini (2000) find that venture capitalists influence institutional investors, investment bankers and their analysts to ensure the success of the IPO process. This influence is the result of many interactions, especially with underwriters. Gompers and Lerner (1997) According to Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) , the presence of venture capitalists in an IPO leads 0.22 more analysts to follow the firm.
Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Aggarwal et al. (2002) argue that underpricing attracts an analyst following. Cliff and Denis (2004) Ownership structure also affects analyst coverage. Bhushan (1989) and O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that the likelihood of analyst coverage is associated with the interests of institutional investors in the firm. The authors conclude that there is a positive relationship between institutional investor ownership and analyst coverage.
Lang et al. (2004) and Boubaker and Labegorre (2008) indicate that analysts are reluctant to cover a firm managed by controlling family members. This is explained, in part, by the reliance of these firms on private communication channels rather than public disclosure, producing a poor informational environment.
Methodology, data and sample statistics

-Methodology:
The results of long-run performance studies are sensitive to methodological choices. We therefore present our results using two frequently used and recommended methodologies (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997) .
First, we use the calendar-time approach of Fama and French (1996) . Their three-factor model assumes that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the riskfree rate [(ER i ) -R f ] is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio (R M -R f ); (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-bookto-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio i is,
where E(R i ) is the monthly return on the IPO portfolio, R f is the one-month Treasury bill rate, E (R M ) is the monthly return on an equally weighted market portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, E(SMB) is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the median), and E(HML) is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks (above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 fractiles of book-to-market ratios).
Second, we use an event-time approach, as in the study of Brav and Gompers (1997) . Fama and French (1992, 1993) The Long-run performance is calculated using the BHAR methodology. The difference between a return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm and the return on a buy-and-hold investment in a portfolio with an appropriate expected return
where R it is defined as the month t simple return of a sample firm and E(R it ) is the month t expected return of the sample firm (that is, the return of firm i's benchmark over the same period).
Long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positively skewed and this positive skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. Lyon et al. (1999) recommend the use of a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic to eliminate this skewness bias.
Data and sample statistics
The data come from different sources. We first identify firms that went public Long-run performance is calculated using the Datastream monthly stock price database. Table 1 Panel C documents that the industry composition of our sample is well-distributed, with the greatest concentration, 17 per cent, being in the business services industry.
Insert Table 1   Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for orphan and non-orphan IPOs. There are 253 IPOs classified as orphans and 1012 classified as non-orphans. The long-term debt of non-orphans is higher than that of orphan IPOs (significant at the 1 per cent level using w and t tests). The average orphan raises $309.61 million in its IPO, compared to $1067.46 million for the average non-orphan. This difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Like prior research, analyst coverage increases according to firm size. We find no significant differences in venture capital backing between orphan and non-orphan IPOs over the entire period. Orphans are associated with more underwriting syndicates, with a mean of 6.86 managing underwriters, compared to 6.48 for nonorphans (the difference is statistically significant using a w test). There is a weak relationship between analyst coverage and underpricing. For instance, orphans have initial returns of 13.85 per cent compared to 15.53 per cent for non-orphans. Nonorphans are more underpriced than orphans and the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level using a w test. Non-orphans are associated with more institutional investor ownership than orphans. For instance, a mean of 73.89 per cent of the shares of IPOs with analyst coverage are held by institutional investors, compared to 31.74 per cent for orphan IPO firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and is confirmed by both t and w tests.
Insert Table 2 3. Results Insert Table 3 We now distinguish IPO firms according to the level of analyst coverage. The findings are reported in table 4. We find that market participants make a relevant distinction between orphan and non-oprhan IPO firms over the entire period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . For instance, the three-year return of non-orphans is -1.17 per cent, compared to -18.09 per cent for orphan IPOs, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. These findings are confirmed over the five-year returns. The Fama-French model shows that investing an equal amount in non-orphan IPO portfolios provides a 0.91 per cent return per month, which is statistically significant (at the 1% level), compared to orphan IPO portfolios (monthly return of 0.11 per cent). The 1990s reveal that the differences between orphan and non-orphan IPOs appear in the first year following the offering. It is worth noting that the one-year returns show the analysts' ability to predict the long-run performance before the disclosure of financial statements. Insert Table 4 Venture capital affiliation, underwriting syndication, institutional investor ownership and underpricing have been shown to influence the long-run performance of IPO firms. Therefore, if there is a relationship between analyst coverage and long-run performance, it may be a manifestation of these variables. We investigate these potential relationships by focusing on each of them individually.
The results of venture capital (VC) affiliation are presented in table 5. We partition our sample into VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. We find significant differences in the long-run performances of orphan and non-orphan VCbacked IPOs. Whatever the horizon and period considered, the long-run returns of nonorphan VC-backed IPOs outperform those of their orphan counterparts. The alpha of the Fama-French model presents similar findings but the difference in returns is not statistically significant.
These results hold for non-VC-backed IPOs except in the 2000s, when investors paid no attention to analyst coverage.
Insert Table 5 From Insert Table 6 Table 7 shows that, over the entire period, highly underpriced non-orphan IPOs We find no differences between the long-run returns of orphan and non-orphan minimally underpriced IPOs over the entire period. Hence, analyst coverage has investment value only for highly underpriced IPOs.
Insert Table 7 Once we account for ownership structure, table 8 shows that non-orphan IPOs with a high level of institutional investor ownership (IPOs with institutional investor ownership above the median level are classified as 'high'; otherwise, they are classified as 'low') outperform their orphan counterparts. The event-time approach indicates that the difference is statistically significant regardless of the considered horizon. However, in the 2000s, this difference is only statistically significant over a five-year horizon.
Globally, these results hold for IPOs with a low level of institutional investor ownership.
Insert Table 8 In summary, these findings suggest that investors and market participants pay attention to analyst coverage when IPOs have large underwriting syndicates and are highly underpriced. The differences between orphans and non-orphans persist in VCbacked and non-VC-backed IPOs and whatever the ownership structure of the IPOs (that is, those with a high versus low level of institutional investors). The 2000s reveals that the differences between orphan and non-orphan IPO firms are diminishing.
Next, we investigate the characteristics of analyst coverage by determining the number of financial analysts providing coverage. Numerous studies have documented a positive relationship between the coverage number and the subsequent short-and longrun performances (Bradley et al., 2003; Das et al., 2006) . These findings are reported in table 9 . We find that IPOs with a high level of coverage (those with a coverage number above the median level are classified as 'high'; otherwise, they are classified as 'low') perform better than IPOs with low coverage from three to five years after the IPO date. Insert Table 9 To verify that the univariate results presented in tables 4 through 9 are robust in a multivariate setting, we report our regression model in able 10. The dependent variable in the regression is the long-run performance of IPOs, as determined by the BHARs over one, three, and five years. As Bradley et al. (2008b) note that a common oversight in examining analyst coverage is the endogenous problem between performance and analyst coverage. That is, the quality of an IPO is slowly revealed to the public through financial statements and other public sources after it has been issued.
Therefore, other savvy investors could have predicted the long-run IPO performance.
The analysts may just be jumping on the bandwagon when information is provided by other sources, such as financial statements. Our research model overcomes this obstacle. (Bhushan, 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Barth et al., 2001 ). The results of our model are statistically significant and it helps to explain the long-run performance of US IPOs.
We find non-orphan IPOs to be positively and significantly related to long-run performance over the five-year horizon, which is broadly consistent with the univariate analysis results given in table 3. This finding reveals that market participants do not fully incorporate the perceived value of analyst coverage. Both the syndicate and operating performance variables explain a significant component of the long-run IPO performance regardless of the considered horizon. The other variables (such as underpricing, VC backing and institutional investors) fail to explain the long-run performance of US IPOs over the period from 1991 to 2010.
Insert Table 10 4. Conclusion
We examine the long-run performance of US IPOs carried out between 1991 and 2010 and find that the IPOs in our sample performed negatively relative to the comparison portfolio over this period, but this result varies substantially across sub-periods. We compare the long-run performance of firms that do not receive analyst coverage (orphans) to those that do (non-orphans). This abnormal long-run performance is considerably more severe for orphan IPOs than for non-orphan IPOs given a three-to five-year horizon. The evidence suggests that analyst coverage is indeed important to the issuing firm but the market does not fully incorporate the perceived value of this coverage. Once we control for other characteristics that have been shown to influence the long-run performance of IPOs, we find that investors and market participants pay attention to analyst coverage when IPOs have large underwriting syndicates and are highly underpriced. The difference between orphans and non-orphans persists in VCbacked and non-VC-backed IPOs, and whatever the ownership structures of the IPOs.
Notably, however, the 2000s reveals that the difference between orphan and non-orphan IPO firms is diminishing. This trend may be attributable to scandals affecting analyst coverage, as both regulators and the financial press have identified analyst research that had been tainted by conflicts of interest.
Finally, multivariate regression analysis establishes that analyst coverage is significantly related to the long-run performance of IPOs, contrary to the study of Bradley et al. (2008b) . Table 4 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms over the period from 1991 to 2010. Long-run performance is computed as buy-andhold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60 months. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Type of abnormal return Table 5 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by underwriting syndicate over the period from 1991 to 2010. Firms with a number of managers above the median level are classified as large, otherwise small. Long-run performance is computed as buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60 months. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Type of abnormal return 
VC backing
Dummy variable equals 1 if venture capitalists are affiliated with the IPO at the time of the offering and 0 otherwise.
Institutional investors
Dummy variable equals 1 if the percentage of shares held by institutional investors who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares at the time of the offering is above the median level and 0 otherwise. Coverage Dummy variable equals 1 if the amount of coverage is above the median level and 0 otherwise.
ROA
Natural logarithm of the change in return on assets. The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO date.
Asset turnover
Natural logarithm of the change in asset turnover (sales divided by total assets) The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO date.
Sales
Natural logarithm of the change in sales. The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO date.
Capital expenditures
Natural logarithm of the change in capital expenditures The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO date.
